Mental illness, narrative, and rhetorics of recovery by Bruce, Anders Rains
James Madison University
JMU Scholarly Commons
Senior Honors Projects, 2010-current Honors College
Fall 2013
Mental illness, narrative, and rhetorics of recovery
Anders Rains Bruce
James Madison University
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/honors201019
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Senior
Honors Projects, 2010-current by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
dc_admin@jmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bruce, Anders Rains, "Mental illness, narrative, and rhetorics of recovery" (2013). Senior Honors Projects, 2010-current. 392.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/honors201019/392
 Mental Illness, Narrative, and 
Rhetorics of Recovery 
_______________________ 
 
A Project Presented to 
 
the Faculty of the Undergraduate 
 
College of Arts and Letters 
 
James Madison University 
_______________________ 
 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
 
for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts 
_______________________ 
 
by Anders Rains Bruce 
 
December 2013 
 
 
 
Accepted by the faculty of the Department of Writing, Rhetoric and Technical Communication, James Madison 
University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts. 
 
FACULTY COMMITTEE: 
 
 
       
Project Advisor:  Dr. Traci Zimmerman, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor and Interim Director, School of 
Writing, Rhetoric and Technical Communication 
 
 
       
Reader:  Dr. Scott Lunsford, Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor, School of Writing, Rhetoric and 
Technical Communication 
 
 
       
Reader:  Dr. Sean McCarthy, Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor, School of Writing, Rhetoric and 
Technical Communication 
HONORS PROGRAM APPROVAL: 
 
 
       
Barry Falk, Ph.D., 
Director, Honors Program
  
 2 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................... 3 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 4 
Disability Theory and Madness ...................................................................................................... 5 
Why Narrative? ............................................................................................................................. 18 
Mobilizing Narrative..................................................................................................................... 24 
Navigating Recovery Between and Beyond Models .................................................................... 34 
Works Cited .................................................................................................................................. 36 
 
  
 3 
Acknowledgments 
First, I would like to thank my project advisor, Dr. Traci Zimmerman, for helping me 
navigate logistics, for being a pillar of support throughout this process, and for inspiring me to 
study writing and rhetoric in the first place. 
Next, I would like to thank the members of my committee, Dr. Scott Lunsford and Dr. 
Sean McCarthy, for their incisive feedback and extensive support over the past three semesters 
of research and writing. I would also like to thank honorary committee member Dr. Susan 
Ghiaciuc for sparking my interest in disability studies and for being a wonderful sounding board 
as I have explored these ideas. 
This fall, I had the opportunity to present a paper adapted from this project at the 24th 
Annual Conference of the Mid-Atlantic Popular and American Culture Association (MAPACA). 
I owe this opportunity to the School of Writing, Rhetoric, and Technical Communication and the 
Honors Program, both of which provided crucial funding. I am grateful to Dr. Ghiaciuc and Dr. 
Cathryn Molloy for helping me revise my conference paper proposal. I am also grateful to my 
committee members for helping me get the conference paper itself into presentable shape. 
  
 4 
Introduction 
Recovery from mental illness is a hotly contested topic. Pro-psychiatric groups like the 
National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) tout medication as a tool that makes life livable; 
skeptical groups like Mind Freedom International (MFI) see medication and diagnosis as part of 
the problem. These conflicting notions of recovery reflect competing models of mental illness, 
which can be classified into two broad categories: medical and social. People with mental 
illnesses are often left to find their own way between these poles, trying to reconcile lived 
experience with binaristic representations of recovery. 
In this project, I aim to complicate the binary oppositions that so often inform the 
discourse surrounding mental illness. First, drawing on concepts from disability studies, I 
investigate the evolution, implications, and limitations of different models of mental illness. 
Then, I explore the ways in which narrative works as an imperfect but functional tool to navigate 
a hybrid path between models. Choosing particular written artifacts as rhetorical case studies, I 
analyze how advocates mobilize narrative in promoting hybrid visions of recovery. Throughout, 
I intersperse fragments of my own experience with mental illness that illustrate the complexity of 
defining, let alone realizing, recovery. I aim to show that binaristic models of mental illness fail 
to capture the nonlinear, contingent, and—frankly—maddening nature of recovery from mental 
illness. 
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Disability Theory and Madness 
 My primary lens for theorizing mental illness (a term I will use interchangeably with 
madness) is disability theory.1 Scholars of disability are devoting increasing attention to 
madness, conceptualizing it as a kind of mental disability. A recent issue of Disability Studies 
Quarterly with the theme “Madness and Disability” exemplifies this trend. In their introduction 
to this issue, editors Noam Ostrander and Bruce Henderson describe how disability studies can 
be used “to trouble the borders of normal/abnormal and sane/insane.” In seeking to trace and 
destabilize popular attitudes toward recovery from mental illness, I hope that my work, too, will 
trouble the borders of such binaries. 
The Medical Model: Recovery as Binary? 
 Binaristic conceptions not only of mental illness but of disability in general can be traced, 
in large part, to longstanding medical approaches. Disability theorist Tobin Siebers succinctly 
summarizes the medical model of disability: 
Briefly, the medical model defines disability as a property of the individual body 
that requires medical intervention. (25) 
That is to say, in much medical discourse, disabilities are framed as diseases that must be 
overcome, or at least battled, through medical treatment. The term disability, in this conception, 
is essentially synonymous with illness or impairment. The complexity and variety of disabled 
people’s lives and circumstances tends to be overlooked, with doctors, caregivers, and other 
would-be allies instead focusing on the “cure or elimination” of the impairment in question (3). 
In other words, able-bodiedness is defined as the absence of disability. Within a cure-or-
                                                 
1 The term mental illness implicitly endorses a medical model of the mind; after all, the word illness is present in the 
term itself. Disability scholars, who tend to favor social constructionist rather than medical approaches, therefore 
prefer to use the term madness. I use the two terms interchangeably in hopes of blurring this distinction; after all, my 
goal in this project is to negotiate a hybrid path between paradigms too often represented as mutually exclusive. 
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eliminate approach to impairment, ability and disability—and, accordingly, sanity and insanity—
are thus positioned as polar opposites. 
 For much of the twentieth century, medical treatments of mental illness were based on a 
cure-or-eliminate approach. Chief among these treatments were Freudian psychoanalysis and the 
lobotomy, a surgical procedure that has since been discredited. The medical doctor and historian 
Mical Raz has examined how these two treatment modalities, despite their apparent differences, 
gave rise to a shared, medicalized discourse of psychiatry. She notes that “tens of thousands of 
lobotomies were performed on Americans in order to treat and cure mental illness” between 
1935 and 1965 with “very little opposition [from] psychoanalytically oriented psychiatrists” 
(387, emphasis mine; 388). Indeed, the two modalities operated in tandem; typically, a patient 
subjected to a lobotomy would subsequently receive psychoanalytic talk therapy. Raz discusses 
how Walter Freeman, a physician who personally performed more than 3,500 lobotomies, 
frequently framed his work in psychoanalytic terms. For example, Freeman claimed that during 
“nearly a quarter of a century” spent performing lobotomies he had “been hunting the Super 
Ego,” asserting that lobotomy constituted “the solution of the most malignant forms of Super 
Ego dominance” (Freeman qtd. in Raz 410). By the same token, the psychoanalyst John Rosen 
compared the “sever[ing] of connections in the brain [i.e. lobotomy] with the severing of the 
connections between schizophrenics and their mothers” (411). Within this entwined psychiatric 
discourse, lobotomy combined with psychoanalysis was thus represented as a “solution” or 
“cure” that eliminated psychological malignancies. 
Within public discourse more broadly, the cure-or-eliminate approach exemplified by 
lobotomy helped to reinforce a sane/insane dichotomy. Diefenbach et al., a group of 
psychological and media scholars, examine popular reportage on the lobotomy between 1935 
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and 1960. In earlier coverage especially, the moment at which the patient receives the lobotomy 
represents a dramatic break between a preceding period of illness and a post-op period of 
recovery. For example, a news article from 1941 portrays the procedure in glowing terms: 
From problems to their families and nuisances to themselves, from ineffectives 
and unemployables, many… have been transformed into useful members of 
society. (Kaempffert qtd. in  Diefenbach et al. 65) 
In this account, recovery from mental illness is nothing less than a transformation. The pre-op 
insanity of “nuisances” and “unemployables” is contrasted with the post-op sanity of “useful 
members of society.” A Time magazine article from 1942 expresses the same contrast in direr 
terms, warning that mentally ill people who failed to obtain lobotomies risked an “unchanged 
psychotic personality leading to complete insanity” (65). Sanity is represented as easily 
distinguishable from insanity, with medical treatment resulting in complete and recognizable 
recovery from mental illness. 
Contemporary Medicalization: Recovery as Continuum 
Today, an epoch of psychoanalysis and lobotomy has given way to an emphasis on 
psychiatric drugs. The journalist and science writer Robert Whitaker, in his book Mad in 
America, traces contemporary psychiatric practices back to the invention of the antipsychotic 
Thorazine in 1953. Thorazine seemed to have an unprecedented degree of success in treating the 
psychosis that can accompany mental disorders such as schizophrenia and manic depression 
(now known as bipolar disorder). Whitaker questions whether Thorazine and subsequent 
psychiatric drugs have actually been as effective as they are reputed to be; however, a thorough 
investigation of the science behind medication would exceed the scope of this paper. What is 
important from a rhetorical standpoint is that Thorazine and other drugs have, especially since 
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January 2010 
The doctor tells me I've had a 
panic attack. She says I have a 
"chemical imbalance." That I may 
need medication for the rest of my 
life. 
The idea is comforting: With 
proper treatment, I can manage my 
feelings. And it feels right. For as long 
as I can remember, I've been 
inundated by rhetoric that portrays 
mental disorders as lifelong, 
biological illnesses best treated with 
medication. I think of TV commercials 
where sad people take drugs and 
become happy. I’m willing to give it a 
try. 
She prescribes an antidepressant 
for daily use and Xanax for the bad 
days. 
the ‘60s, been represented as the most effective means of treating mental illness and therefore 
vital to recovery. 
 The creation and popularization of the chemical imbalance hypothesis of mental illness 
serves as the basis for such representations. This hypothesis picked up steam in the ‘60s, 
following the invention of the antidepressant drugs iproniazid and imipramine. These drugs, 
which both worked on the neurotransmitters (brain chemicals) serotonin and norepinephrine, 
seemed to improve symptoms of depression. Consequently, some researchers theorized that 
depression was caused by a deficit of those neurotransmitters. As Whitaker writes, “the NIMH’s 
Joseph Schildkraut, in a paper published in the Archives 
of General Psychiatry, reviewed this body of research 
and set forth a chemical imbalance theory of affective 
disorders” in 1965 (62). Since then, this theory has 
become a cornerstone of pro-psychiatric rhetoric. 
Doctors, as Whitaker describes, regularly draw upon the 
language of chemical imbalance in explaining 
psychiatric conditions to their patients and prescribing 
psychotropic medication (97). The notion that madness is 
caused by chemical imbalance is invoked in claims that 
psychiatric drugs treat symptoms by balancing brain 
chemicals and, therefore, address the root cause. 
 The contemporary model of the chemical imbalance does ameliorate some of the 
binaristic excesses of the previous psychoanalytic/surgical paradigm. To begin with, in modern 
psychiatric practice, the idea of treating a root cause is distinguished from curing or eliminating 
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the underlying illness. Rhetoric posted on the website of the National Alliance on Mental Illness 
(NAMI), the largest and most well-known mental health advocacy group in the United States, 
reflects this distinction. In online factsheets about specific conditions, such as Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder, NAMI recapitulates the medicalized notion that mental illnesses are 
caused by chemical imbalances that medication can address (Duckworth and Freedman 1). 
However, in a more generalized discussion of recovery, NAMI does not portray these 
medications as curing those conditions: 
Mental health medications do not cure mental illness. However, they can often 
significantly improve symptoms and help promote recovery and are recognized as 
first-line treatment for most individuals. (“Treatment and Services”) 
This quotation illustrates how contemporary psychiatric practice is focused on helping patients 
cope with symptoms rather than promising to eliminate those symptoms entirely. There is a 
marked difference between claims that medications can “improve” symptoms and “help 
promote” recovery and the exuberant endorsements of transformative treatment that 
characterized the era of the lobotomy. Psychiatry today has thus come to conceive of recovery in 
more measured and incremental terms. 
Medicalization and Advocacy Discourse 
While contemporary medical practices allow for a continuum of recovery, pro-psychiatric 
advocates sometimes appropriate medicalized language to promote a more simplified and 
binaristic view. For example, even as NAMI asserts that mental disorders cannot be cured, the 
organization distinguishes rigidly between treated and untreated mental illness in a factsheet 
called “About Recovery.” The factsheet first defines recovery as “a process, beginning with 
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diagnosis and eventually moving into successful management of your illness.” To support this 
definition, the factsheet then frames madness in explicitly medical terms: 
Severe mental illnesses are treatable disorders of the brain. Left untreated, 
however, they are among the most disabling and destructive illnesses known to 
humankind. […] Stigma, shame, discrimination, unemployment, homelessness, 
criminalization, social isolation, poverty, and premature death mark the lives of 
most individuals with the most severe and persistent mental illnesses. (“About 
Recovery”) 
The statement above is clearly intended to elicit the reader’s interest by raising concern about a 
“disabling and destructive” societal problem. But it also achieves a subtler aim: By equating 
“[s]evere mental illnesses” to “treatable disorders of the brain,” the statement above embraces a 
medical model of the mind. 
The factsheet proceeds to present medication as the best available solution to this societal 
problem: 
Science has greatly expanded our understanding and treatment of severe mental 
illnesses. […] Newer classes of medications can better treat individuals with 
severe mental illnesses and with far fewer side effects. (“About Recovery”) 
Recovery, having been explicitly defined as “successful management of your illness” and 
implicitly equated to medical treatment, is here represented as a fairly straightforward matter of 
compliance with a medication regimen. The “disabling and destructive” effects of mental 
disorders “left untreated” are contrasted with the ostensibly scientifically-validated healing 
power of psychiatric drugs. This treated/untreated dichotomy reiterates the sane/insane—i.e. 
abled/disabled—binary that disability studies seeks to complicate.  
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 But what if “recovery” is sometimes more 
complicated than simply complying with a 
medication regimen? What if medication sometimes 
makes the patient worse? And, regardless of how 
effective medical treatment may be for some patients, 
what effect does the medical model have on the 
identity formation and rhetorical participation of mad 
people as a whole? 
Binaries, Oppression, and Identity Politics 
 Historical medical practices, along with some contemporary medicalized discourse, 
uphold binaries that distinguish rigidly between sane and insane, treated and untreated. Siebers 
discusses how such attitudes, which he conceptualizes as an “ideology of ability,” work to 
exclude disabled people from full and equitable participation in public discourse (7). The 
ideology of ability "alienates the individual [with disabilities] as a defective person" (72). This 
alienation is particularly pronounced for mad people. After all, per NAMI’s aforementioned 
“About Recovery” factsheet, mental disorders are widely considered to be “destructive,” a 
stigma that reinforces the sane/insane binary. Siebers argues that this kind of alienation hinders 
"the ability of people with disabilities to organize politically" (72). Due to its size, funding, and 
institutional heft, a group such as NAMI exerts extensive rhetorical influence in propagating 
sane/insane and treated/untreated binaries. By contrast, due to these very dichotomies, it is 
difficult for mad people to form advocacy groups of their own or otherwise participate in 
discourse. 
August 2011 
(Xanax withdrawal:  month 4) 
The inside of my skull is boiling 
when I dart outside for a run. The air is 
so heavy and wet it sticks to my lungs. 
I think about heading back inside to 
use the treadmill instead, but I’m afraid. 
When I use the treadmill, I have to pay 
careful attention to the numbers on its 
display screen: distance traveled, time 
elapsed, calories burned. If the digits of 
those numbers don’t add up to 
particular sums, then something horrible 
will happen. 
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Despite some progress, then, the medical model continues to prevent disabled people 
from identity politics effectively and, consequently, has a dehumanizing effect. Siebers observes 
that "it is extremely unlikely [in this model] that a blind person will be allowed to take a 
leadership position in the blind community, let alone in the sighted community" (72-73, 
emphasis mine). Notice the words “be allowed”; rather than disabled people choosing their own 
leaders, nondisabled caregivers and other allies are privileged as decision-makers. PhebeAnn 
Wolframe points out a similar way in which medicalization impedes mad activism specifically: 
Mad people's political affiliations (for example, choosing to take part in a public 
protest) [...] can similarly be framed as symptoms within the context of having 
been given a psychiatric diagnosis. 
Relative to disabled people in general, mad people thus face a unique burden in trying to 
organize politically: Activism can itself be construed as a symptom and, on those grounds, their 
rhetoric can be excluded from public discourse. The rhetorician and disability scholar Catherine 
Prendergast points out that this sort of exclusion denies full rhetorical citizenship and, indeed, 
personhood to mentally disabled people (“On the Rhetorics” 57). Overall, such rhetorical 
disenfranchisement illustrates how, although psychiatry has made some progress toward 
conceptualizing recovery as a continuum, medicalized binaries retain enduring discursive force. 
The Social Model 
 In order to combat such oppression, disability scholars have tended to favor social 
constructionist rather than medical perspectives. Siebers positions the social model in opposition 
to its medical alternative: 
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The social model opposes the medical model by defining disability relative to the 
social and built environment, arguing that disabling environments produce 
disability in bodies and require interventions at the level of social justice. (25) 
In this model, a state of disability is not a quality of an individual body but rather a question of 
context. Disability becomes re-imagined as a social construct that emerges out of interactions 
between people and their built and social environments. Consider a person who has a vision 
impairment. The social model would argue that myriad architectural and social features of that 
person's surroundings actually create his/her state of disability. Architecturally speaking, 
crosswalks with visual but not auditory cues would make it more difficult for that person to get 
from place to place independently; socially speaking, discrimination in hiring continues to this 
day (Kwoh). Within an accessibly-designed context, that person would cease to be disabled.2 
Social constructionists, then, do not endorse an abled/disabled binary, for they do not 
deem bodies to be either inherently able or impaired. Rather, they stress the need to redesign 
inaccessible environments and reshape prejudicial attitudes in order to create a more equitable 
society for people of all bodies. That is to say, they take a social justice approach rather than a 
cure-or-eliminate approach. Social constructionists recognize how what the disability theorist 
and literary scholar Rosemarie Garland-Thomson calls the “opposing twin figures” of abled and 
disabled—for our purposes, sane and insane—work together to “legitimate a system of social, 
economic, and political empowerment” that privileges the abled and sane (Thomson qtd. in 
Lewis 116). The social constructionist goal is to destabilize these dichotomies and build more 
accessible environments for all people. 
                                                 
2 Siebers provides a historical illustration of how the social environment can determine whether a condition is 
disabling or not: “Deafness was not, for instance, a disability on Martha’s Vineyard for most of the eighteenth 
century because one in twenty-five residents was deaf and everyone in the community knew how to sign. Deaf 
villagers had the same occupations and incomes as hearing people (Shapiro 1993, 86)” (74). 
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Social constructionism creates a space where disabled minority identities can thrive. In 
Siebers's account, the social model has "changed the landscape of thinking about disability 
because it refuses to represent people with disabilities as defective citizens and because its focus 
on the built environment presents a common cause around which they may organize politically" 
(73). People with disabilities, organized around this common paradigm, have come together to 
form politically potent identity groupings. Such organization has resulted in important successes. 
By practicing identity politics, disabled people have secured legal protections such as the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and begun to make headway against discriminatory 
environments and attitudes. 
Social Constructionism and Mad Pride 
One model of madness closely related to the social model of disability is the Mad Pride 
movement. Mad Pride, it should be noted, is not a monolithic bloc but rather a coalition of 
activists who self-identify in different ways. The three most notable identity groupings within 
Mad Pride are consumers, survivors, and ex-patients, which in conjunction are referred to as 
C/S/X. Consumers do not call for our current mode of mental health treatment to be abolished 
altogether but advocate reforms to reduce coercion and increase choice. Survivors and ex-
patients, meanwhile, emphasize the harm that psychiatric treatment can cause, pointing to 
medical and judicial coercion as well as the debilitating side effects and withdrawal symptoms 
that can result from use of psychiatric drugs. 
The disability scholar Bradley Lewis reviews the history of Mad Pride. He situates its 
origins during the 1970s in relation to other social justice activism, particularly the disability 
rights movement. “Early founders of the movement,” Lewis writes,” “shared common 
experiences of being treated with disrespect, disregard, and discrimination at the hands of 
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psychiatry”; meanwhile, activists in the burgeoning disability movement also expressed 
discontent with callous and dehumanizing medical treatment (118). These common origins 
reflect common goals. 
In subsequent decades, though, the two movements have grown apart. Building on 
Lewis’s research, Nev Jones and Robyn Lewis Brown, scholars of disability and madness, 
discuss persistent tension between the fields: 
[T]he historical and sub-cultural trajectories of the consumer/survivor/ex-patient 
(c/s/x) and disability rights movements have diverged significantly, and 
individuals involved with both movements have at times accused each other of 
implicit ableism or saneism. 
One point of contention is that C/S/X perspectives remain underrepresented in academe—even 
within disability studies itself. Another more fundamental issue is that services for mental health 
users and people with other disabilities “have developed independently of one another, draw on 
different private and federal funding sources, and employ clinicians and providers with divergent 
training and disciplinary backgrounds.” These different social landscapes result in different sorts 
of lived experiences for mad people on the one hand and people with other kinds of disabilities 
on the other. 
Still, reflecting the intersections of these two fields, C/S/X advocacy draws on many of 
the same concepts and arguments as the social model of disability. Like disability activists, Mad 
Pride activists speak from a social constructionist standpoint to refute medicalized binaries and 
ableist/saneist privilege. Jones and Brown observe that “criticisms of biomedical and cognitivist 
models of mental illness are consistent with the repudiation of medical and moral models of 
disability in favor of broadly social models that acknowledge social, cultural and structural 
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forces.” As C/S/X discourse points out, much of the distress associated with madness actually 
stems not from the symptoms themselves but from stigma, shame, lack of employment 
opportunities, and other factors in the built and social environment. Hence, as Jones and Brown 
argue, “disability studies can clearly provide a forum for discussing issues concerning 
psychiatric disability or diversity.” 
Although potential coalitions of c/s/x and 
disability activists are still emerging, the Mad Pride 
movement has attained vital victories of its own. 
Lewis writes that a turning point for the movement 
came in 2003: a hunger strike targeting a trade 
organization for psychiatrists during which 
participants “demanded evidence that mental and emotional distress results from ‘chemical 
imbalances’ in the brain” (115). After initially stonewalling, the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA) replied in writing that “brain science has not advanced to the point where 
scientists or clinicians can point to readily discernible pathological lesions or genetic 
abnormalities that in and of themselves serve as a reliable or predictive biomarkers of a given 
mental disorder,” a response that, like the strike, was widely reported in national media (APA 
qtd. in Lewis 124). Following this admission from the APA, Mad Pride activists leveraged their 
national stage to defeat planned budget cuts to peer support products. By framing mental 
disorders not as defects of the individual but as forms of socially-constructed oppression, Mad 
Pride has created a discourse within which mad people can claim minority identities for 
themselves and practice the kind of identity politics that Siebers envisions. 
January 2011 
The Xanax starts to have bad 
side effects. Now that I'm taking the 
drug every day, people are telling 
me that my personality has changed. 
I seem "foggy" and irritable; I'm 
forgetting things. And, although I 
don't yet know it, my brain has 
become physically dependent on 
Xanax. 
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MindFreedom Advocacy: Reductivist Recovery 
 Social constructionism is far from a panacea, and Mad Pride does not offer a perfect fit 
for every mentally ill person. Socially-oriented advocacy rhetoric can at times lapse into 
reductive, wholesale dismissal of medical models of treatment. Online advocacy literature 
created by the Mad Pride organization MindFreedom International (MFI) exemplifies this risk. 
For example, on a Frequently Asked Questions page, MFI makes a sweeping statement about 
psychiatric diagnoses: 
[Diagnostic] labels are words that are put on others without their permission. 
MindFreedom helps turn the tables. For more than a decade, MindFreedom has 
helped promote and network groups and individuals who celebrate "Mad Pride." 
(“MindFreedom”) 
Diagnoses of mental disorder can certainly be used oppressively; as Wolframe notes, political or 
religious involvement is often seen as suspect in the context of a mental health diagnosis. On the 
other hand, many people choose to seek a diagnosis 
following months or years of severe distress and, upon 
being diagnosed, use their “labels” to obtain 
appropriate medical treatment, accommodations, and 
other positive valences. The blanket statement that 
diagnoses are “words that are put on others without 
their permission” fails to consider the complex, nuanced, and varied circumstances in which 
different mad people live. Indeed, the “consumer” aspect of C/S/X recognizes that many mad 
activists continue to draw on medication, therapy, and other medical approaches to recovery. 
One tool for recovery that epitomizes this medical/social blending is narrative.  
December 2009 
My heart is throbbing so hard 
that I think it will force its way out of 
my chest. The physical sensations 
are scary—the racing heart, the 
gasps for air, the trembling of my 
hands. 
But the really scary part is that I 
think I'm having a heart attack. I'm 
convinced that I'm about to die.  
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Why Narrative? 
 Narratives can offer further insight into medical and social conceptions of recovery and 
into potential intersections of the two paradigms. Interestingly, medical and social perspectives 
alike vest narrative with purported therapeutic power. In both paradigms, the act of writing one’s 
story is seen as potentially healing, while reading a firsthand account of madness is presumed to 
offer insight into the experience. This preoccupation with narrative reveals a fundamental flaw in 
both models: a desire to structure, to order, to fix. Furthermore, rhetors working within both 
medical and social models often share personal stories to promote particular visions of recovery. 
Accounts of personal experience thus function in multiple, intersecting ways to codify 
assumptions about and approaches to recovery from mental illness. 
Narrative as Healing Rhetoric 
 Narrative is often represented as a kind of rhetoric uniquely vested with healing potential 
for both rhetor and audience. For example, people with mental illnesses are often encouraged to 
keep journals in the context of medical treatment. In Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (DBT), one 
of the most popular treatment modalities for mental disorders, patients track their symptoms and 
coping techniques day-to-day using worksheets and diary cards. This kind of quotidian self-
narration is presumed to be helpful to patients in studying and managing their symptoms 
(Koerner and Linehan 84). By the same token, friends and relatives of mentally ill people, along 
with clinicians in training, are urged to read firsthand accounts of madness in order to understand 
better their loved ones’ or patients’ conditions. The medical doctor and literary scholar Stephen 
T. Moran, looking at narratives of depression by Hemingway and other notable authors, writes 
that “it may be helpful for clinicians to study narratives of illness” because such narratives 
convey the “heterogeneity” of patients’ lived experience (79). He coins the term 
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“autopathography” to describe life-writing about illness. In these contexts, autopathography is 
represented as a tool that helps patients to manage their own symptoms and that assists others in 
supporting patients. 
 The rhetorician Jacqueline Rinaldi echoes this view, portraying narrative as a kind of 
therapeutic knowledge production. She proposes a "therapeutic rhetoric" based on her experience 
helping seven students to write about their "struggles with disability" (822, 825). She writes: 
Though writing and revising narratives of disability could not restore the crippled 
bodies of these writers, the insights learned from the heuristics of writing did 
seem to have therapeutic value for those grappling with the darker issues of 
chronic illness. (831) 
In Rinaldi’s account, narrative’s benefit to disabled people is that it assists them in coming to 
terms with their symptoms and gaining “insights” into their conditions. Implicitly, then, the 
disabled writers must have lacked insight prior to writing their narratives. It would seem that 
lived experience is not sufficient, in itself, to generate knowledge; it must be reflected upon—
ordered—fixed in writing. 
 Rinaldi’s argument comports with the work of the rhetorician Jim Corder, who contends 
that narrative is essential to the formation of all knowledge. He argues that, “[w]hether 
consciously or not, we always station ourselves somewhere in our narratives when we use 
language” (17). In turn, he presents all knowledge as dependent on language; writing with James 
Baumlin, he characterizes knowledge as “language-based” and “language-bound” (Corder and 
Baumlin 465). If language use always emerges out of narrative, and if knowledge always 
originates in language, then all knowledge stems from narrative. 
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 Within a framework where all knowledge is narrated, all knowledge must also be 
subjective. Accordingly, Corder and Baumlin exhort scholars to eschew methodologies that 
aspire toward objectivity; they argue that true objectivity is neither possible not desirable. In 
hewing to methodologies that produce "fact papers" rather than "opinion papers," scholars 
assume a rhetorical posture of objectivity, but the production of knowledge remains inherently 
subjective (464). Corder and Baumlin call for academic inquiry to be re-imagined around the 
principle that "as opinion derives from research, research is opinion; research is, at every stage, 
interpretation" (465). In breaking down the barriers between research and opinion—between 
knowledge and interpretation—scholars can liberate themselves from "the tyranny of certain 
models over our conception of fact and knowledge" (469). So-called "objectivity," in this 
reading, is not conceptualized as an avenue for discovering capital-T Truth. Rather, objectivity is 
reframed as an ideological mode of knowledge-production that valorizes itself by dismissing 
competing modes as "opinion." 
 Corder and Baumlin are hardly the first scholars to challenge notions of objectivity; nor 
have they been the last. Unlike other critics in this vein, however, their description of subjectivity 
as necessarily narrated lends an interesting perspective to portrayals of autopathography as a 
mode of healing. In both Rinaldi’s and Corder and Baumlin’s work, narrative structure is 
presented as an ideal mode for producing and ordering subjective knowledge, a process resulting 
in healing. Looked at in conjunction, then, the perspectives of these rhetoricians evince a 
worldview where language, narrative, knowledge, and healing are inextricably intertwined. 
Though narrative cannot, as Rinaldi acknowledges, mend “crippled bodies,” might it not be 
beneficial for mental disorder? 
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Problems with Narrating Mental Illness 
Prendergast raises a fundamental issue with attempts to prescribe narrative as a tool for 
recovering from madness: People with certain mental disorders may be incapable of constructing 
coherent narratives, or at least narratives that are recognizable as such.  She questions “the 
therapeutic value of rich, descriptive, and ambiguous narratives,” especially for people with 
conditions that interfere with normative language use, noting that “too often [these narratives’ 
therapeutic] value is assumed” (“On the Rhetorics” 55). These kinds of narratives, especially in 
the case of a disorder like schizophrenia, reflect exceptional experiences. Prendergast argues that 
a typical or “unexceptional” experience of madness is likely to be characterized by fluctuating 
circumstances and degrees of impairment (“The Unexceptional Schizophrenic” 61). The desire to 
fix mad experiences with narratives reflects that “the public does not want to allow for 
fluctuation between states, and even less for the possibility that both states exist at once” (61). 
Corderian notions of narrated subjectivity become troubled within this frame. While a 
writer reflecting on a past experience of depression may be able to write cogently and vividly, a 
writer in the midst of florid psychosis is unlikely to be capable of the same. The idea that 
narrative is central to subjectivity therefore borders on saneism; the internal lives of people with 
language impairments are conceptualized as being less generative of knowledge. Within a strong 
Corderian paradigm, where knowledge and narrative are seen as essentially synonymous, people 
incapable of normative narration could be characterized as lacking any knowledge at all! 
 More insidiously, readers of firsthand accounts may not realize that they are only being 
exposed to a narrow subset of mad experience, which reinforces ableist and saneist assumptions. 
Disability scholar and rhetorician Margaret Price examines the “hegemonic history” of the 
autopathography. Responding to Moran’s piece, she notes that “Moran selects for attention only 
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‘unusually articulate’ and quite canonical ‘sufferers,’” reflecting a larger societal tendency to 
focus on conventionally articulate stories of extreme mental states (178). Writers with more 
profound language impairments, or whose experiences resist linguistic expression, may lack 
reliable Web access and a safe place in which to write, let alone the ability to publish in print 
form a memoir about mental illness. Perhaps the problem is that readers expect such a degree of 
comprehensibility and structure when reading narrative. These complications speak to the 
potentially oppressive effects of assumptions—per Rinaldi and Corder and Baumlin—that 
subjectivity should be structured in order to count as knowledge. 
Because such a limited range of mad people’s lived knowledge is able to find linguistic 
expression, the narratives that do get written represent a skewed sample—one that runs the risk 
of recapitulating harmful binaries. The people who do write “unusually articulate” accounts of 
madness tend to be those who either respond well to medication or whose symptoms resolve on 
their own; people contending with ongoing symptoms of mental illness are more likely to find 
articulate self-expression beyond their grasp.  
Another fundamental issue with the notion of therapeutic narrative is the presumption 
that structured subjectivity—an ordered self, fixed in writing—is desirable in the first place. 
Siebers helps to complicate this presumption in describing the body as "vital and chaotic,” 
asserting that it "possess[es] complexity in equal share to that claimed today by critical and 
cultural theorists for linguistic systems" (26). The body, in this account, becomes a set of 
systems vested with complexity and significance that precede, inform, and rival language use. 
Unlike the written word, the body is not fixed and linear, but rather “chaotic.”3 The idea of the 
                                                 
3 Of course, many scholars would dispute whether the written word is necessarily fixed and linear. The same caveat 
applies to narrative in particular. For example, Ochs and Capps—like Corder—examine narrative as a lived process, 
finding that children are especially likely to produce “nonlinear narratives” (88). Moreover, narrative need not be 
reduced to the written word alone; Wolf discusses how video games present dynamic, “maze”-like narratives using 
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body as capable of signification even absent language provides a welcome counterpoise to 
Corder and Baumlin’s theory. Indeed, Siebers criticizes the limitations and inflexibility of 
theorists who interpret "nearly all symbolic behavior in strictly linguistic terms" (2). He positions 
this critique within a larger argument about the potential for disabled bodies to exert rhetorical 
force—an argument to which I will later return. For now, suffice it to say that disability theory 
allows for lived knowledge that transgresses norms in ways so fundamental as to resist linguistic 
expression. 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
“visual grammar” (109, 94). However, as Prendergast argues, subjectivity is strongly associated with the ability to 
speak and write in conventionally coherent ways, and conventions of coherence privilege linear, fixed storytelling. 
Ethos in Tatters 
From my story—depending on how I might tell it—you might take 
away that I was a non-compliant patient and serial medication-quitter. 
Or you might see me as a melodramatic malingerer, someone who 
overreacted to adolescent anxiety. 
Was I never really all that sick? Or am I still sick and in denial? 
Maybe I do need medication. Maybe I will need medication. 
What do I know about mental illness? I'm not objective. I'm not 
fair. I'm (chemically?) imbalanced. 
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Mobilizing Narrative 
 Apart from its purported therapeutic benefits, narrative is regularly deployed in defense 
of various notions of recovery from mental illness. The narratives examined below should not be 
considered representative of mad people’s experiences; as discussed above, only a limited and 
atypical subset of mad people produce conventionally articulate autopathographies. Nor should 
each story even be considered representative of all narratives deployed in service of a given 
model. Mad people ascribe to different visions of recovery for so many different reasons, within 
so many different circumstances: Some use medication; some do not; some suffer debilitating 
withdrawals from that medication; some endure terrible trauma; and issues of gender, race, class, 
and other social factors inflect all of these experiences. 
I do not intend for the narratives examined here to serve as referenda on entire models. 
Indeed, though each narrative does stress either a medical or social perspective, each draws on 
elements of the opposite perspective as well, showing how models tend to blend in practice. 
Rather, these two stories are intended to serve as rhetorical case studies. The purpose of these 
case studies is to show how autopathography, as a form for codifying lived knowledge, requires 
rhetors to make choices that artificially order and fix experiences of madness. These particular 
narratives were selected because, in assigning order to their experiences, the writers reinforce 
troubling binaries. 
Recovery As Coping and Compliance: The Treatment Advocacy Center’s Medicalized Narration 
The Treatment Advocacy Center (TAC), founded by psychiatrist E. Fuller Torrey in 
1998, favors aggressive medical treatment of mental illness. The group advocates a mode of 
treatment known as Assisted Out-Patient (AOT), which enables states to compel mentally ill 
people to obtain treatment without actually committing them to institutions. TAC favors this kind 
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of forcible treatment because it considers the decision not to take medication to be, itself, a 
symptom of mental illness. This kind of catch-22 is similar to what Wolframe describes, where 
mad people’s political affiliations and other choices are sometimes dismissed as mere symptoms. 
 TAC’s rhetoric makes frequent references to “recovery” from mental illness. In a post 
titled “Medication: The Foundation of Recovery,” Edward G. Francell, Jr.—a former member of 
the TAC Board of Directors who himself “suffers from manic-depression [bipolar disorder]”—
describes his own experience and encourages others to obtain medical treatment. He uses his 
story to argue that compliance with a medication regimen is indispensible in recovery from 
mental illness. 
Francell begins the essay by defining mental illness in terms that guide readers to a 
particular vision of recovery: 
For many consumers, proper medication management can provide the necessary 
foundation for recovery from neurobiological disorder (mental illness). 
In equating “mental illness” to “neurobiological disorder,” he frames mad experience in medical 
terms, setting up “proper medication management” as the primary mode of treatment. As when 
the National Alliance on Mental Illness equates “mental illnesses” and “brain disorder,” the 
framing of mental illness as “neurobiological disorder” sets up an essentially foregone 
conclusion that meds are the best response: It is only natural to assume that medical treatment is 
the optimal response to a medical problem. Francell’s description of “proper medication 
management” as the “necessary foundation for recovery” fits naturally into his medicalized 
definition of madness.   
Francell returns throughout the essay to a theme of “compliance” and stresses social 
support as a means of ensuring compliance. For example, he recommends support groups on the 
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grounds that they help “keep you [the patient] compliant [with medication].” By the same token, 
he suggests to family members and other allies that “good-natured pestering can help 
compliance.” These recommendations evince a curious infusion of social concerns into medical 
modality. Social factors become incorporated into medical treatment, combined into a rhetoric of 
recovery-as-compliance. 
Francell’s definition of recovery reveals a similar hybridity. He repudiates the cure-or-
eliminate attitude of older medical approaches, writing that “[r]ecovery does not mean getting rid 
of the illness.” Nor does he blinker his vision of recovery by limiting it solely to the medical 
realm. While med compliance may be the “foundation” of recovery, he envisions the process as 
involving much more than simply symptom management. To Francell, recovery means “gaining 
back a sense of control, a sense of purpose in life.” In discussing the complex and incremental 
nature of such recovery, he even incorporates tenets from the social model of disability, referring 
to “the years lost to the illness, the loss of friends, societal stigma, and the pain of being ill itself” 
as “secondary disabilities.” Disability, here, is not being defined purely as biomedical 
impairment but as a mix of biological and social factors. In treating this kind of disability, 
psychiatric treatment represents a starting point, but social factors cannot be neglected. 
Francell cites his own story to develop this hybrid vision of recovery. He writes: 
I moved in and out of the hospital from about age 18 to 22, and “field tested” 
about 10 drugs in the process, until a second opinion found me a stabilizing 
medication. It was then that the slow process of recovery actually began. 
Francell’s lengthy journey deserves respect and illustrates the benefit that some mad people do 
realize from medical treatment. At the same time, he describes profound side effects that 
complicate the cost/benefit analysis. For example: 
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Dystonia is a drug reaction that can be very subjectively unpleasant, where the 
throat muscles become rigid, like a powerful invisible force grabbing you by the 
neck and holding you off the ground. Dystonia scared the hell out of me, and 
made me feel helpless, rather like falling into quicksand. 
Another side effect approaches potentially life-threatening levels: 
[L]ithium once caused me to drink so much water it was backing up my 
esophagus and I was literally drowning 
Francell describes these side effects as “controllable” and credits medication with his ability to 
function day-to-day. He also thanks his mother for helping to make sure that he continued taking 
his meds even when side effects were hard to tolerate. Recovery is thus represented as a complex 
calculus where symptom management, side effects, and social support must all be weighed. 
Francell, then, writes honestly and vividly of both medical challenges such as symptoms 
and side effects and social challenges such as stigma. However, despite this blended approach, 
his autopathography does reinforce a treated/untreated binary. In terms of the content of the 
story, Francell represents treatment as so crucial—so vastly preferable to untreated madness—as 
to be worth the risk of drowning one’s own lungs in retained fluid. The placement of Francell’s 
text on the TAC website also reinforces this binary. Francell’s position as a patient who 
responded relatively well to medication is what enables him both to write an articulate story in 
the first place and to share his story on the TAC’s website; because his lived experience of 
madness comports with TAC’s agenda, he is given a platform to share it.  
Francell’s story, like the rhetorical theories of Rinaldi and Corder and Baumlin, frames 
mental illness as something to be fixed in multiple senses of the word. At one point, he quotes an 
unnamed “consumer with schizophrenia”: 
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I once knew a consumer with schizophrenia who had a lot of restlessness, or a 
side effect called akathisia, who made the greatest statement about side effects I 
have ever heard. He said, “When I look good, I feel bad. When I look bad, I feel 
good.” 
The subjective unpleasantness of dystonia or akathisia, in 
this account, is preferable to untreated schizophrenia, 
further reflecting the treated/untreated binary. Moreover, 
the ability to function socially—to “look good”—is 
privileged over a patient’s internal world. The chaotic 
subjectivity of untreated mental illness is implicitly 
framed as needing to be structured—through medication, 
narrative, or perhaps a combination. 
Recovery As Overcoming: Ron Unger’s Social Constructionist Perspective 
Ron Unger, a licensed clinical social worker, runs a site called Recovery from 
“Schizophrenia” and Other “Psychotic Disorders.” Unger is a longtime MindFreedom 
International (MFI) activist who promotes a vigorously social constructionist model of recovery. 
His notion of recovery eschews the measured and incremental outlook of contemporary 
psychiatric approaches; recovery, in Unger’s account, becomes a matter of discarding oppressive 
psychiatric labels and embracing mad experience. As a result, though, Unger’s vision veers 
toward an ableist cure-or-eliminate approach, reflecting a problematic theoretical underpinning 
reminiscent of older medical practices. 
Unger’s use of scare quotes in the site’s title around the words “schizophrenia” and 
“psychotic disorders” immediately suggests his skepticism toward formal diagnostic categories. 
April 2011 
After three months, the Xanax 
isn't even helping me to sleep 
anymore. I lie awake for hours every 
night, my mind crawling, my feelings 
flat. 
When I tell the doctor that the 
Xanax isn't working any more, she 
says there are still antidepressants 
we haven't tried yet. 
I walk out. I'm done. That night, I 
stop taking my meds. 
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This rhetorical strategy works to situate Unger’s narrative within social constructionist advocacy, 
reflecting Mad Pride hostility toward the idea of mental disorders as discrete disease entities. 
Indeed, in a list of “Questions and Answers about Recovery” posted on the homepage, Unger 
explains why he uses the scare quotes: 
It often helps to see words like “schizophrenia” as just labels that psychiatrists use 
when people have certain experiences and behave in certain ways [...] Recovery is 
often facilitated when people focus directly on how to manage this stress and how 
to reconsider their points of view and change their communication and their 
behavior, rather than trying to fight or escape from some abstract entity such as 
their alleged “schizophrenia.” 
Psychiatric diagnoses, in Unger’s reading, are subjective constructs rather than diseases. It is 
unsurprising that Unger, as an MFI activist, would echo MFI’s distrust of labels in his narrative 
What does it mean to recover from a construct? Unger gives a definition of “recovery” 
markedly more optimistic and transformative than Francell’s: 
Recovery means having regained a meaningful life, no longer having a mental 
health diagnosis, and no longer being in need of any sort of mental health 
treatment. 
Unger contrasts his definition with “the definitions used by some who suggest that recovery 
should be thought of as learning how to have a better life, while continuing to be mentally ill and 
needing treatment such as medications.” He proceeds to note that “full recovery is just a 
possibility, not a requirement that anyone must fulfill in order to have a meaningful life”; without 
condemning the decision to take meds, he offers the reader an alternative. His vision repudiates 
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contemporary psychiatric practices oriented toward incremental improvement and, to some 
readers, could provide an infusion of optimism. 
 More darkly, this conception of recovery is reminiscent of effusive press coverage of 
medical treatment during the lobotomy’s heyday and takes on ableist overtones. In short, Unger 
envisions the cure and elimination of mental illness. Despite Unger’s protest that full recovery is 
just a “possibility, not a requirement,” the notion of “continuing to be mentally ill” is presented 
as inherently less desirable than that of recovering fully. He explicitly describes mental disability 
as inferior to nondisability by referring to persistent experiences of madness as “lesser degrees of 
recovery.” In making these rhetorical moves, Unger portrays disability as something to be 
overcome rather than a valuable form of diversity. 
In sharing his story, Unger further develops this portrayal of recovery as overcoming. He 
traces his own experiences of madness to childhood trauma and reports that, in his senior year of 
high school, he started “getting a bit ‘grandiose’ or even ‘psychotic’” (“Personal Steps”). The 
details of what Unger’s “madness” actually entailed are sparse; he focuses primarily on the 
positive social and intellectual ramifications of being “creatively mad,” writing: 
I was fortunate enough to find people who could see me as “mad” in an 
interesting kind of way, and who had their own interest in challenging personal 
and cultural identity. … I learned it was possible to challenge the limits of 
everything we thought we knew, and at the same time think systematically. 
Unger’s first experience with medical treatment came when he “sought counseling in [his] 30’s 
to deal with unresolved trauma issues.” He does not report ever having used psych meds himself, 
much less having been forced to accept treatment or incarcerated. Rather, he bases his vision of 
recovery on years of experience as a social worker who took on “a role of supporting people to 
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make their own thoughtful evaluations of the use or non-use of medications” and on decades of 
activism with groups such as MFI. His own madness, he writes, occurred within “a safe 
container”—a quality conspicuously absent from many others’ experiences (including 
Francell’s), which may be characterized by persistent distress as well as the threat of 
confinement. 
Although shot through with veins of ableist sentiment and based on a somewhat 
privileged ideal of safely-contained madness, Unger’s narrative does evince the liberatory 
potential of Mad Pride. His challenge to diagnostic categories fits into a broader agenda of social 
reform: Rather than endorsing medicalized modes of classification and treatment to manage 
individuals’ impairments, Unger focuses on the role of social context in constructing mental 
disability. As a solution, he calls for the creation of discursive spaces where diverse ways of 
thinking and feeling are valued and madness can be safely experienced. 
Unger's vision of recovery fits into a frame where mad minority identity thrives. But is it 
practical? As someone who was harmed by psychotropic medication and no longer takes any 
meds, I initially found his vision to be immensely appealing. The problem, though, is that living 
post-meds has turned out to be messy—too messy for a narrative of overcoming, however 
uplifting, to capture. On days when my anxiety has kept me awake for two days in a row, for 
example, I’m less concerned with the question of etiology—of whether my symptoms are 
biomedical or socially constructed in nature—and more concerned with how to cope. I value my 
medication-free life, and claiming a minority identity as a mad (rather than sick) person has been 
instrumental to me as I’ve built that life. Quitting meds and moving beyond a strictly medical 
paradigm has helped me to reconceive of my experience—to find value and lived knowledge in 
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my non-normative ways of thinking and feeling. Yet my symptoms are still distressing, and they 
have not been eliminated. I have not been cured. 
Indeed, to many people living with mental illnesses, Unger's vision seems more like a 
mirage. A conversation posted on the blog Malingering Normal between Unger, an ex-patient 
named Mary, and madness scholars Nev Jones and Timothy Kelly speaks to the limitations of 
"full recovery." Kelly and Jones argue that Unger's experiences are not representative of mad 
people generally. Jones asserts that a fleeting "psychotic- like" experience cannot meaningfully 
be compared to "enduring, repeated psychosis–including very acute/florid forms." Kelly writes 
that any such comparison is akin to comparing "apples and fire engines." 
Reading this conversation, I become more 
conscious of my own standpoint. Although I had anxiety 
before starting Xanax, my more "severe symptoms"—to 
rely again on medical terminology—only flared up during 
the withdrawal. Even as I endured frightening changes, I 
did so with the assurance that my perceptions would with 
time return to what they had been. My thoughts and 
feelings, in this frame, always seemed explicable and 
transient—in a word, "safe." Though my anxiety lingers to this day, and though I wrestle with 
the distress it causes, I feel secure in the knowledge that even the most exhausting bout of 
insomnia or intrusive thoughts will pass. 
The experiences described by Kelly and Jones lack this quality of safety and security. 
Kelly writes of having "struggled with ongoing psychotic episodes beginning in adolescence that 
have continued to recur in spite of trying many different things." Jones writes as "someone who 
July 2011 
(Xanax withdrawal:  month 3) 
I took comfort. The things I was 
experiencing—the perceptions so 
unlike any I had ever had before—
would not be permanent. They were 
the product of a temporary 
disturbance in my biochemistry, one 
that researchers had identified, 
studied, and defined. I was able to 
separate myself from my terrifying 
perceptions, to conceptualize part of 
my mind as other, as alien, as 
disease. 
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has now been 'in the system' for 8 years, with on-going psychosis, and experience of multiple 
forms of voluntary, involuntary and self-initiated treatment, discrimination, etc." Neither my 
experiences nor Unger's can speak to this sort of persistent distress. 
I am reminded, uncomfortably, of the problems with disability immersion. The idea of 
immersion is that a nondisabled person can, by temporarily simulating an experience of 
impairment, come to a deeper understanding of what it's like to live with a disability. Elizabeth J. 
Donaldson has discussed immersion in the context of psychiatric disabilities. She describes how, 
starting in the 1950s, mental health professionals ingested LSD in an attempt to simulate 
psychosis. These researchers' experiences were well-intended attempts to become more 
empathetic toward schizophrenic patients. Yet this kind of empathy should not be confused with 
a genuine understanding of mad people's lived knowledge. During an immersion experience, the 
certainty of a "return to 'normal perceptions and thoughts' and the distance from the threat of 
insanity" differ fundamentally from the reality of many psychiatric disabilities. To claim a 
familiarity with madness based on an immersion experience would be to appropriate a minority 
identity from a position of privilege. 
My withdrawal experience, though rather more protracted than a one-day trip on LSD, 
arguably acquired the defining characteristic of a disability immersion experience: the assurance 
of transience. The same might be said of Unger's narrative, in which he describes "exploring 
madness within a safe container." The problem with a "safe container" is that it is not truly 
immersive. For me or Unger to generalize would be simplistic at best and, as Kelly writes, 
"offensive" to mad people whose experiences have not been so safe. 
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Navigating Recovery Between and Beyond Models 
The hybridity given voice in Francell’s and Unger’s stories points to a promising way 
forward. While these stories incorporate different models in problematic ways, they do suggest 
the potential of narrative to mediate between contending paradigms. The next step is to find a 
way of destabilizing binary oppositions that does not fix and structure experiences. Siebers’s 
concept of complex embodiment offers a framework for supra-linguistic hybridity. 
Complex Embodiment 
 Siebers introduces this concept by describing the shortcomings of both medical and social 
models of disability: “Some scholars complain that the medical model pays too much attention to 
embodiment, while the social model leaves it out of the picture" (25). To address these 
shortcomings, he proposes complex embodiment as a way to blend the strengths of each model: 
The theory of complex embodiment raises awareness of the effects of disabling 
environments on people’s lived experience of the body, but it emphasizes as well 
that some factors affecting disability, such as chronic pain, secondary health 
effects, and aging, derive from the body (25). 
Siebers argues that both medical and social models neglect "human mortality and fragility" as 
facts of life. Medical practices have traditionally been developed with the aim of curing or 
eliminating disability, while social models sometimes represent accommodation as a solution to 
all problems faced by disabled people.  
Complex embodiment, in embracing human frailty, counters abled/disabled binaries. For 
these binaries are predicated on the "wish to return the body magically to a past era of supposed 
perfection" and the "insist[ence] that the body has no value as human variation if it is not 
flawless" (26). Such ableist aspirations toward perfection are just as implicated in discussions of 
 35 
mental illness. The history of psychosurgical/psychoanalytic treatment shows how a sane/insane 
dichotomy long guided medical practices of cure and elimination, and contemporary rhetoric 
such as Unger’s shows the enduring rhetorical force of aspirations toward perfect recovery. 
 If not through conventional narrative, then how can complex embodiment help mad 
people to develop and communicate lived knowledge of complicated, hybridized experiences? I 
end this project with a much greater consciousness of my inability to provide definitive answers. 
Rather, I have done what I can to raise further questions. In scattering fragments of my story 
throughout this project, I have aimed to model an alternative to linear narration by blending my 
lived knowledge with the narratives and arguments of others. I hope to have contributed, albeit in 
a small way, to a discourse that does not require mad people to present our complex and 
contingent lived knowledge in a fixed and linear way. Perhaps such a discourse could begin to 
include the voices of “unexceptional” mad people—those whose ongoing experiences of 
madness may hinder them in crafting conventional rhetoric. 
I am willing to lend my voice to whatever kinds of discourse prove most accessible to 
people who think and feel in a variety of ways. More important, I am eager to listen.  
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